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  In this paper, we present an empirical study to find the relationship between discretionary 
accruals quality as well as innate accruals quality and portion of non-executive board of 
directors, concentration of ownership ratio and board size in Tehran Stock Exchange. The 
survey selects 118 qualified stocks from this exchange and using a random technique chooses 
42 firms. The study implements two linear regression techniques to estimate the first part of the 
information and then using structural equation modeling examines six hypotheses. Based on the 
results of this survey we can conclude that an increase on non-executive members positively 
influences on discretionary accruals quality and negatively influences innate accruals quality. 
Concentration of ownership ratio positively influences on discretionary accruals quality and 
negatively impacts on innate accruals quality. Finally, size of board of directors negatively 
impacts discretionary accruals quality and positively influences on innate accruals quality.                
© 2012 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
Keywords: 
Innate and discretionary 
accruals quality  
Corporate governance 
Tehran Stock Exchange 
Transparency  
 
  
  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
During the past few years, there has been growing interest on proposing new methods and techniques 
to assess transparency of financial statement. Many people argue that the recent financial crisis in 
United States banking system was a result of violating rules and regulations. Therefore, many have 
attempted to find the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the quality of 
reported earnings in publicly traded companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) are believed to be the 
first who introduced the idea of corporate governance. In their study, they studied the relationship 
between the owners and managers where each part try to maximize their benefits and since there is 
not a unique flow of information between these two groups we see conflict of interest among them. 
Corporate governance will help reduce any existing conflict and provide a fair flow of information 
between two parties (Gillan, 2006).  
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Klapper and Love (2004) investigated corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in 
emerging markets. They used the relevant information on firm-level corporate governance (CG) 
rankings across 14 emerging markets and reported that there was a wide variation in firm-level 
governance and the average firm-level governance was lower in countries with weaker legal systems. 
They also detected the determinants of firm-level governance and reported that governance was 
correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information and contracting imperfections that firms 
face. Based on their results, better corporate governance was significantly associated with better 
operating performance and market valuation. They also provided some evidences, where firm-level 
corporate governance provisions are more important in countries with weak legal environments. 
 
Bauer et al. (2008) investigated the level of disclosure ensured by corporate governance codes in 
force in European Union member states based on OECD rules and regulations. They performed a 
comparative study on different existing features of corporate governance in the literature by using 
econometric analysis based on different statistical tools such as descriptive analysis, mainly based on 
computing tools, and correlations to detect the relationship between their results and what others 
researchers achieved. The results of the performed analysis disclosed that their results were not 
consistent with prior research findings associated with disclosure as “primary theme” of corporate 
governance codes. By analyzing the results, they have reached to the same conclusion as other 
researchers did on the same topic. Finally, they reported that we could certify that the compliance of 
corporate governance codes with OECD principles was consistent with prior research results 
associated with disclosure considering codes’ issuer type and countries’ legal regime. 
 
Ştefănescu (2011) performed an investigation to find the level of disclosure ensured by corporate 
governance codes in force in European Union member states. She reported that common law regime 
could likely ensure the biggest level of transparency through corporate governance needs. They also 
asserted that the compliance of corporate governance codes with OECD principles was consistent 
with prior research achievement associated with disclosure considering codes’ issuer type and 
countries’ legal regime. Ammann et al. (2011) studied the relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance and firm value based on a dataset from Governance Metrics International (GMI), which 
includes 6663 firm-year observations from 22 developed countries over the period of 2003-2007. 
Based on a set of 64 individual governance attributes they built two alternative additive corporate 
governance indices with equal weights. The corporate governance attributed to the governance 
attributes and one index derived from a principal component analysis and they reported a strong and 
positive relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm valuation. Besides, they studied 
the value associated with governance attributes, which document the companies' social behavior. 
Their findings were robust against alternative calculation procedures for the corporate governance 
indices and to alternative estimation techniques. 
 
Black et al. (2012) first conducted a case study of Brazil, in which they studied Brazilian firms' 
governance practices at year-end 2004, constructed a corporate governance index, and demonstrated 
that the index for ownership structure, board procedure, and minority shareholder rights, predicts 
higher lagged Tobin's q.  Nelson (2005) investigated the link between firm performance, CEO 
characteristics and changes in corporate governance practices based on unbalanced panel of 1721 
over the period of 1980-1995. The paper provided the stylized facts about corporate governance 
practices and explained how governance practices had evolved over time. They reported no 
relationship between CEO age, tenure or compensation and governance changes. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) performed a deep investigation on separation of ownership and control and finally, Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) studied the quality of accruals and earnings by looking into the role of accruals 
estimation errors. Francis et al. (2005) investigated different parameters influencing accruals quality 
including total assets, loss reported in financial statement, life cycle of inventory and receivable 
accounts and operating revenue divided by total assets based on a linear regression analysis and 
discussed the findings.  M. Nazari  et  al. / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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In this paper, we present an empirical study to find the relationship between discretionary accruals 
quality as well as innate accruals quality and portion of non-executive board of directors, 
concentration of ownership ratio and board size in Tehran Stock Exchange.  
 
2. The proposed study 
 
2.1. Variables  
 
PROIND:  Percentage of non-executive members to total number of executive member 
CONC:    Concentration of ownership ratio, the ratio determines portions of the people who own 
at least five percent of the shares 
DAQ:  Discretionary accruals quality 
IAQ: Innate  accruals  quality 
Board size:  The number of people who take part in editorial board 
WCt Δ The change in working capital in time t compared with previous period t-1 
CFOt-1 Cash flow in period t-1 
CFOt Cash flow in period t 
CFOt+1 Cash flow in period t+1 
ΔRevt Change in operating revenue for two consecutive period  
PPEt Fixed asset in period t 
AQ Accruals quality 
SIZEt Natural logarithm of total assets in period t 
LOSSt The number of years that firm reports loss in its statement 
OPCYCt Natural logarithm of mean life cycle of inventory and receivable accounts 
SDORt Standard deviation of operating revenue divided by total assets  
 
 
The main hypothesis of this paper considers whether there is a relationship between concentration of 
ownership and board of director's characterization with discretionary accruals quality and Innate 
accruals quality. The proposed study of this paper considers the following six hypotheses, 
 
1.  The relationship between the ratio of non-executive members of board of directors and 
discretionary accruals quality, 
2.  The relationship between the ratio of non-executive members of board of directors and Innate 
accruals quality, 
3.  The relationship between the ratio of size of board of directors and Innate accruals quality, 
4.  The relationship between the ratio of size of board of directors and discretionary accruals 
quality, 
5.  The relationship between concentration of ownership and Innate accruals quality, 
6.  The relationship between concentration of ownership and discretionary accruals quality. 
  
The proposed study of this paper gathers the necessary data from Tehran Stock Exchange based on 
some predefined rules and regulations. According to our regulation, all stocks must be tradable for the 
period of studies. They must have a unique fiscal year ending March and must not have changes their 
business model within the period of studies. The other requirement is that no financial firm including 
banks, insurance or holding company is permitted. Finally, the structure of board of directors must be 
available for study. Based on these criteria, the information of 118 firms have been qualified for the 
proposed study of this paper and using sampling technique, 42 companies have been gathered. Table 
1 shows descriptive information on our survey. The study has adopted the study accomplished by 
Kent et al. (2010).  
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Table 1 
Descriptive information for 42 firms 
Var.   ΔWCt    CFOt-1  CFOt  CFOt+1   ΔRevt  PPEt  SIZEt  LOSSt  OPCYCt  SDORt  
Mean    356.161    1226.729    3226.449   2612.636   1600.466   859.0678   34.5339   3.5   34.822   153284.1  
Std. Dev.  41.61921  145.82    98.95449  39.36156  15.09866  5.07043  0.5294  0.10475  0.54808  9716.019  
Median    3677   520.5   3445.5   2573.5   1595   865   34.5   4   35   147300.5  
Mode  2975  180  2235.00
 a  2136    1381  816.00
a 38  4  36.00    314.89   
Std. Dev.   452.1003    1584.01   1075.247   427.576   164.0135   55.07892   5.75078   1.13792   5.95371    1.06  E+05 
Variance  204394.7  2509088  1156156  182821.2  26900.42  3033.688  33.071  1.295  35.447  E+10   1.11   
Skewness   0.224 -   2.378   0.441   0.253   0.041   0.805   0.069   0.62 -   0.202   0.152  
Std. dev. 
Skewnesss   0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  0.223  
Percent 
quartile  
25    3056.5   323   2249.5   2214   1443   813.75   31   3   30   58565.41  
50  3677  520.5  3445.5  2573.5  1595  865  34.5  4  35  147300.5  
75   3999    1602   4111.25   3024.25   1771.25   886.25   38   4   38   245987.2  
 
In order to perform regression analysis for the following two linear regression model we need to 
verify normality test. 
 
ΔWCt=β0+ β1CFOt-1+ β2CFOt+ β3CFOt+1+ β4 ΔRevt+ β5PPEt+et      (1)  
AQ=α+ β1SIZEt+ β2LOSSt+ β3OPCYCt+ β4SDORt+et (2)  
 
The first step in performing regression analysis is to make sure that dependent variable is normally 
distributed and to perform this, we perform Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test and KS value for WCt is 
calculated as 0.401. Fig. 1 shows distribution of residuals for regression analysis given in Eq. (1) as 
follows, 
   
Fig. 1. Distribution of residuals for ΔWCt  Fig. 2. Cumulative probability for dependent 
variable ΔWCt 
 
Based on the results of KS and Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 we can conclude that data are normally distributed. 
The other test is to study the correlation among independent variables. Table 2 shows the results of 
Pearson correlation test for independent variables. 
 
Table 2 
The results of Pearson correlation test for Eq. (1) 
 WCT  CFOt-1  CFOt    CFOt+1  Rev  PPE  
WCT  
Pearson test   1  
** 0.262   
** 0.695  
** 0.655  
** 0.648  
** 0.446  
Level of significance    0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
CFOt-1    Pearson test  
** 0.262    1   0.078   0.057   0.125   0.152  
Level of significance  0.004    0.400  0.536  0.178  0.100  
CFOt    Pearson test  
** 0.695   0.078   1   
** 0.938  
** 0.959  
** 0.592  
Level of significance  0.000  0.400    0.000  0.000  0.000  
CFOt+1  
Pearson test  
** 0.655   0.057  
** 0.938    1  
** 0.936  
** 0.657  
Level of significance  0.000  0.536  0.000      0.000  0.000  
Rev  
Pearson test  
** 0.648   0.125   
** 0.959  
** 0.936   1  
** 0.646  
Level of significance  0.000  0.178  0.000    0.000    0.000  
PPE    Pearson test  
** 0.446   0.152  
** 0.592  
** 0.657  
** 0.646   1  
Level of significance  0.000  0.100  0.000    0.000  0.000   
**Results is valid when the level of significance is set to 0.01  M. Nazari  et  al. / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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As we can observe from the results of Table 2, there are some strong correlations among independent 
variables and we need to use stepwise regression analysis. Similarly, we perform Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (KS) test and KS value for WCt is calculated as 1.406. Fig. 3 shows distribution of residuals 
for regression analysis given in Eq. (2) as follows, 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of residuals in AQ equation  Fig. 4. Cumulative probability for dependent 
variable AQ 
 
Based on the results of KS and Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we can conclude that data are normally distributed. 
The other test is to study the correlation among independent variables. Table 3 shows the results of 
Pearson correlation test for independent variables. 
 
Table 3 
The results of Pearson correlation test for Eq. (2) 
 Standard  predicted  error  SIZEt  LOSSt  OPCYCt  SDORt  
AQ   Pearson test   1  
** 0.418    0.016    0.067  
** 0.438   
Level of significance    0.000  
** 0.864    0.470  0.000  
SIZEt   Pearson test  
** 0.418    1   0.105   -   
** 0.250   
** 0.752   
Level of significance   0.000    0.257  0.006  0.000  
LOSSt   Pearson test   0.016   -   0.105   -   1   0.045   -   0.125   -  
Level of significance   0.864  0.257    0.630  0.177  
OPCYC
t  
Pearson test   0.067  
** 0.250    0.045   -   1  
** 0.303   
Level of significance   0.470  0.006  0.630    0.001  
SDORt   Pearson test  
** 0.438 -   
** 0.752    0.125   -  
** 0.303    1  
Level of significance   0.000  0.000  0.177  0.001   
**Results is valid when the level of significance is set to 0.01 
 
Again, we see some strong correlation between some independent variables, which implies that we 
need to use stepwise regression analysis.  
 
3. The results 
 
In this section, we first present details of our regression analysis for the Eq. (1) and Eq. (2).  
 
3.1. The first model  
 
The implementation of stepwise linear regression for the first model is summarized in Table 4 as 
follows, 
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Table 4 
The results of regression analysis when the dependent variable is WCT (R
2= 0.80) 
Model  Non-standard coefficients Standard  coefficients  t Error  B Std.  dev  Beta 
1 
Intercept  3542.003  773.434    4.580  0.000 
CFOt-1  0.066  0.019  0.231  3.490  0.001 
CFOt    0.406  0.107  0.966  3.798  0.000 
CFOt+1  0.174  0.221  0.164  2.786  0.004 
Rev  1.357-  0.700  0.492-  1.938-  0.000 
PPE 0.403  0.726  0.049  2.556  0.005 
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 4, all t-student values are valid and the regression covers 
91% of the results. The results of regression analysis is summarized as follows, 
 
ΔCt=3542.003+ 0.066CFOt-1+ 0.406CFOt+ 0.174CFOt+1- 1.357ΔRevt+ 0.403 PPEt+773.434 et  (3)
Table 5 shows the results of ANOVA test. 
 
Table 5 
The results of ANOVA test for Eq. (1) 
Model  Sum of Least squares  df  Mean  F  Level of significance 
 
1 
 
RSS  1.296E7  5  2591266.8  26.485  0.000 
ESS 1.096E7  36  97837.93     
TSS  1.391E7  41       
 
As we can observe from the results of ANOVA test, the null hypothesis can be rejected when the 
level of significance is one percent and we can conclude that the first linear regression is valid. 
 
3.2. The second model  
 
The implementation of stepwise linear regression for the second model is summarized in Table 6 as 
follows, 
 
Table 6 
The results of regression analysis when the dependent variable is AQ (R
2= 0.81) 
Model  Non-standard coefficients Standard  coefficients  t Error  B Std.  dev  Beta 
 
 
2 
Intercept  89.063  17.082    5.214  0.000 
SIZEt 0.752  0.442  0.207  -1.701  0.092 
LOSSt  1.319  1.481  0.72  2.515  0.010 
OPCYCt 0.757  0.295  0.216  2.561  0.012 
SDORt  7.202  0.000  0.364  -2.936  0.004 
 
As we can observe from the results of, except two cases, the other coefficients maintain valid t-
student values. Eq. (4) shows details of our findings, 
 
AQ=89.063+0.752SIZEt +1.319LOSSt+ 0.757OPCYCt+ 7.202SDORt+ 17.082et  (4)
Similarly, we have performed ANOVA test for the second model and Table 7 shows details of our 
findings. As we can observe from the results of ANOVA test, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
when the level of significance is one percent and we can conclude that the first linear regression is 
valid.  
 
 
 M. Nazari  et  al. / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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Table 7 
ANOVA test results for the second model 
Model   SUM of Squares  df  Mean  F  Error   
 
2   
  
RSS   14451.136    5    2890.227   8.836   0.000   
ESS    36635.387  36  327.102     
TSS   51086.523   41        
 
 
3.3. The impact of PROIND, CONC and BOARD SIZE on DAQ and IAQ 
 
In this section, we perform structural equation modeling (SEM) to determine the effects of three 
PROIND, CONC and BOARD SIZE on two variables of DAQ and IAQ using LISREL software 
packages. Fig. 5 shows details of our results for the proposed SEM model, 
 
Fig. 5. The results of SEM model 
 
Based on the results, we can derive the following results, 
 
DAQ = 0.89*PROIND - 0.44*CONC –0.69*Board SIZE    Error var. = 0.0012, R² = 0.95  (5)
IAQ = -0.55PROIND + 0.048*CONC + 0.05*Board size      Error var. = 0.002, R² = 0.93 (6)
 
In our proposed model, the ratio of Chi-Square on degree of freedom is 1.6<3, NFI is equal to 0.97, 
NNFI is 0.93, CFI is equal to 0.92, GFI and AGFI are also equal to 0.91 and 0.90, respectively. The 
results confirm the findings of SEM model. Table 8 shows the summary of our results. 
 
Table 8 
The summary of our results for six hypotheses 
Hypothesis    Path  P Value    Results  
H
’
1   Proind → DAQ 0.001   <    Accept  
H
’
2   Proind → IAQ 0.001   <  Accept  
H
’
3   Conc→ DAQ 0.001   <   Accept  
H
’
4   Conc→ IAQ 0.001   <  Accept  
H
’
5   Board Size→ DAQ 0.001   <   Accept  
H
’
6   Board Size→ IAQ 0.001   <  Accept  
 
As we can observe from Table 8, all eight hypotheses have been confirmed and we can conclude that 
an increase on non-executive members positively influences on discretionary accruals quality and 
negatively influences innate accruals quality. Concentration of ownership ratio positively influences 
on discretionary accruals quality and negatively impacts on innate accruals quality. Finally, size of   3030
board of directors negatively impacts discretionary accruals quality and positively influences on 
innate accruals quality.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical study to find the relationship between discretionary 
accruals quality as well as innate accruals quality and portion of non-executive board of directors, 
concentration of ownership ratio and board size in Tehran Stock Exchange. The survey selected 118 
qualified stocks from this exchange and using a random technique selected 42 companies. The study 
used two linear regression techniques to estimate the first part of the information and then using 
structural equation modeling examined six hypotheses. Based on the results of this survey we can 
conclude that an increase on non-executive members positively influences on discretionary accruals 
quality and negatively influences innate accruals quality. Concentration of ownership ratio positively 
influences on discretionary accruals quality and negatively impacts on innate accruals quality. 
Finally, size of board of directors negatively impacts discretionary accruals quality and positively 
influences on innate accruals quality. 
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